A Research and Development (R&D) Roadmap for Broadly Protective Coronavirus Vaccines: A Pandemic Preparedness Strategy

Broadly protective coronavirus vaccines are an important tool for protecting against future SARS-CoV-2 variants and could play a critical role in mitigating the impact of future outbreaks or pandemics caused by novel coronaviruses. The Coronavirus Vaccines Research and Development (R&D) Roadmap (CVR) is aimed at promoting the development of such vaccines. The CVR, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and The Rockefeller Foundation, was generated through a collaborative and iterative process, which was led by the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) at the University of Minnesota and involved 50 international subject matter experts and recognized leaders in the field. This report summarizes the major issues and areas of research outlined in the CVR and identifies high-priority milestones. The CVR covers a 6-year timeframe and is organized into five topic areas: virology, immunology, vaccinology, animal and human infection models, and policy and finance. Included in each topic area are key barriers, gaps, strategic goals, milestones, and additional R&D priorities. The roadmap includes 20 goals and 86 R&D milestones, 22 of which are ranked as high priority. By identifying key issues, and milestones for addressing them, the CVR provides a framework to guide funding and research campaigns that promote the development of broadly protective coronavirus vaccines.

A research and development (R&D) roadmap for broadly protective coronavirus vaccines: A pandemic preparedness strategy.

Broadly protective coronavirus vaccines are an important tool for protecting against future SARS-CoV-2 variants and could play a critical role in mitigating the impact of future outbreaks or pandemics caused by novel coronaviruses. The Coronavirus Vaccines Research and Development (R&D) Roadmap (CVR) is aimed at promoting the development of such vaccines. The CVR, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and The Rockefeller Foundation, was generated through a collaborative and iterative process, which was led by the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) at the University of Minnesota and involved 50 international subject matter experts and recognized leaders in the field. This report summarizes the major issues and areas of research outlined in the CVR and identifies high-priority milestones. The CVR covers a 6-year timeframe and is organized into five topic areas: virology, immunology, vaccinology, animal and human infection models, and policy and finance. Included in each topic area are key barriers, gaps, strategic goals, milestones, and additional R&D priorities. The roadmap includes 20 goals and 86 R&D milestones, 26 of which are ranked as high priority. By identifying key issues, and milestones for addressing them, the CVR provides a framework to guide funding and research campaigns that promote the development of broadly protective coronavirus vaccines.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Dose, Infection, and Disease Outcomes for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): A Review.

The relationship between severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) dose, infection, and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outcomes remains poorly understood. This review summarizes the existing literature regarding this issue, identifies gaps in current knowledge, and suggests opportunities for future research. In humans, host characteristics, including age, sex, comorbidities, smoking, and pregnancy, are associated with severe COVID-19. Similarly, in animals, host factors are strong determinants of disease severity, although most animal infection models manifest clinically with mild to moderate respiratory disease. The influence of variants of concern as it relates to infectious dose, consequence of overall pathogenicity, and disease outcome in dose-response remains unknown. Epidemiologic data suggest a dose-response relationship for infection contrasting with limited and inconsistent surrogate-based evidence between dose and disease severity. Recommendations include the design of future infection studies in animal models to investigate inoculating dose on outcomes and the use of better proxies for dose in human epidemiology studies.

BSAC Vanguard Series: the future of ADVOCACY on AMR.

The COVID public health emergency has brought home how vulnerable we are to forces beyond our control. We are losing our ability to treat infectious diseases for a number of reasons, including antimicrobial resistance (AMR). AMR is a 'slow-moving' threat, which makes it harder to recognize and address. The situation has not been helped by the difficulty we have had in seeing the actions and health of everyone on this planet as interconnected. The COVID pandemic has changed this. Despite the dire predictions of the effect of AMR in the future, we still have time to change course. Advocacy by scientists and health professionals is a powerful tool in this process, but there are pitfalls and it must be used wisely. In this article I suggest a number of ways in which this can be achieved.

A Research and Development (R&D) roadmap for influenza vaccines: Looking toward the future.

Improved influenza vaccines are urgently needed to reduce the burden of seasonal influenza and to ensure a rapid and effective public-health response to future influenza pandemics. The Influenza Vaccines Research and Development (R&D) Roadmap (IVR) was created, through an extensive international stakeholder engagement process, to promote influenza vaccine R&D. The roadmap covers a 10-year timeframe and is organized into six sections: virology; immunology; vaccinology for seasonal influenza vaccines; vaccinology for universal influenza vaccines; animal and human influenza virus infection models; and policy, finance, and regulation. Each section identifies barriers, gaps, strategic goals, milestones, and additional R&D priorities germane to that area. The roadmap includes 113 specific R&D milestones, 37 of which have been designated high priority by the IVR expert taskforce. This report summarizes the major issues and priority areas of research outlined in the IVR. By identifying the key issues and steps to address them, the roadmap not only encourages research aimed at new solutions, but also provides guidance on the use of innovative tools to drive breakthroughs in influenza vaccine R&D.

Pandemic diseases preparedness and response in the age of COVID-19-a symposium report.

For years, experts have warned that a global pandemic was only a matter of time. Indeed, over the past two decades, several outbreaks and pandemics, from SARS to Ebola, have tested our ability to respond to a disease threat and provided the opportunity to refine our preparedness systems. However, when a novel coronavirus with human-to-human transmissibility emerged in China in 2019, many of these systems were found lacking. From international disputes over data and resources to individual disagreements over the effectiveness of facemasks, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed several vulnerabilities. As of early November 2020, the WHO has confirmed over 46 million cases and 1.2 million deaths worldwide. While the world will likely be reeling from the effects of COVID-19 for months, and perhaps years, to come, one key question must be asked, How can we do better next time? This report summarizes views of experts from around the world on how lessons from past pandemics have shaped our current disease preparedness and response efforts, and how the COVID-19 pandemic may offer an opportunity to reinvent public health and healthcare systems to be more robust the next time a major challenge appears.

The relationship of large city out-of-hospital cardiac arrests and the prevalence of COVID-19.

BACKGROUND: Though variable, many major metropolitan cities reported profound and unprecedented increases in out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA) in early 2020. This study examined the relative magnitude of those increases and their relationship to COVID-19 prevalence. METHODS: EMS (9-1-1 system) medical directors for 50 of the largest U.S. cities agreed to provide the aggregate, de-identified, pre-existing monthly tallies of OHCA among adults (age >18 years) occurring between January and June 2020 within their respective jurisdictions. Identical comparison data were also provided for corresponding time periods in 2018 and 2019.  Equivalent data were obtained from the largest cities in Italy, United Kingdom and France, as well as Perth, Australia and Auckland, New Zealand. FINDINGS: Significant OHCA escalations generally paralleled local prevalence of COVID-19. During April, most U.S. cities (34/50) had >20% increases in OHCA versus 2018-2019 which reflected high local COVID-19 prevalence. Thirteen observed 1·5-fold increases in OHCA and three COVID-19 epicenters had >100% increases (2·5-fold in New York City). Conversely, cities with lesser COVID-19 impact observed unchanged (or even diminished) OHCA numbers. Altogether (n = 50), on average, OHCA cases/city rose 59% during April (p = 0·03). By June, however, after mitigating COVID-19 spread, cities with the highest OHCA escalations returned to (or approached) pre-COVID OHCA numbers while cities minimally affected by COVID-19 during April (and not experiencing OHCA increases), then had marked OHCA escalations when COVID-19 began to surge locally. European, Australian, and New Zealand cities mirrored the U.S. experience. INTERPRETATION: Most metropolitan cities experienced profound escalations of OHCA generally paralleling local prevalence of COVID-19.  Most of these patients were pronounced dead without COVID-19 testing. FUNDING: No funding was involved. Cities provided de-identified aggregate data collected routinely for standard quality assurance functions.

Infectious Disease Threats: A Rebound To Resilience.

The US has experienced a series of epidemics during the past five decades. None has tested the nation's resilience like the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which has laid bare critical weaknesses in US pandemic preparedness and domestic leadership and the nation's decline in global standing in public health. Pandemic response has been politicized, proven public health measures undermined, and public confidence in a science-based public health system reduced. This has been compounded by the large number of citizens without ready access to health care, who are overrepresented among infected, hospitalized, and fatal cases. Here, as part of the National Academy of Medicine's Vital Directions for Health and Health Care: Priorities for 2021 initiative, we review the US approach to pandemic preparedness and its impact on the response to COVID-19. We identify six steps that should be taken to strengthen US pandemic resilience, strengthen and modernize the US health care system, regain public confidence in government leadership in public health, and restore US engagement and leadership in global partnerships to address future pandemic threats domestically and around the world.

Development and deployment of COVID-19 vaccines for those most vulnerable.

Development of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines is a global priority and the best hope for ending the COVID-19 pandemic. Remarkably, in less than 1 year, vaccines have been developed and shown to be efficacious and are already being deployed worldwide. Yet, many challenges remain. Immune senescence and comorbidities in aging populations and immune dysregulation in populations living in low-resource settings may impede vaccine effectiveness. Distribution of vaccines among these populations where vaccine access is historically low remains challenging. In this Review, we address these challenges and provide strategies for ensuring that vaccines are developed and deployed for those most vulnerable.

Critical Considerations for COVID-19 Vaccination of Refugees, Immigrants, and Migrants.

As COVID-19 vaccines are distributed across the United States, it is essential to address the pandemic's disproportionate impact on refugee, immigrant, and migrant (RIM) communities. Although the National Academies Press Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine provides recommendations for an equitable vaccine campaign, implementation remains. Practical considerations for vaccine rollout include identifying and overcoming barriers to vaccination among RIM communities. To identify barriers, information regarding vaccine beliefs and practices must be incorporated into the pandemic response. To overcome barriers, effective communication, convenience of care, and community engagement are essential. Taking these actions now can improve health among RIM communities.

COVID-19: The CIDRAP Viewpoint Part 3: Smart Testing for COVID-19 Virus and Antibodies

From the Introduction: Testing for SARS-CoV-2 [severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2]--the virus that causes COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]--is one part of the complex system required to address the pandemic. Testing is essential to confirm infection in cases and contacts, guide patient care, inform our understanding of transmission dynamics, prepare the health system for case surges, and inform the level of economic activity consistent with public health goals for limiting SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Technology to conduct molecular, antigen, and serology tests is now available, and additional technologies will be made available soon. The requirements for SARS-CoV-2 testing are unprecedented in both their urgency and the need for scalability, which present both technical and policy challenges. Current plans for clinical and public health laboratory testing do not sufficiently address the infrastructure needed to perform such tests. Critical guidance and coordination at the federal level is needed to meet the SARS-CoV-2 testing demand.COVID-19 (Disease);Disaster response--Plans

COVID-19: The CIDRAP Viewpoint Part 4: Contact Tracing for COVID-19: Assessing Needs, Using a Tailored Approach

From the Introduction: In situations involving major outbreaks or high rates of endemic disease, contact tracing is most effective either early in the course of an outbreak or much later in the outbreak when other measures have reduced disease incidence to low levels. In the latter instance, contact tracing is more manageable and can be used to eliminate remaining small foci of infection. Contact tracing, for example, was key in the late stages of the smallpox eradication program and has played an important role toward global polio eradication. [...] While contact tracing can be a valuable public health tool, its success depends on certain characteristics of the pathogen;the epidemiology of the disease involved;the thoroughness and follow-up of the contacts identified;the availability of rapid testing, preventive treatment and/or a vaccine;and the acceptance and effectiveness of quarantine for those potentially incubating an infection and of isolation for those found to be infected. Characteristics of the pathogen that influence the potential success of contact tracing include the routes of transmission (such as via aerosol, contaminated surfaces, or bodily fluids), the incubation period, the serial interval (the time between contact with a primary case and development of symptoms in a secondary case), the asymptomatic ratio (the percentage of infected people who remain completely asymptomatic during the course of their illness), the timeframe that people can transmit the disease before they develop symptoms, and the degree to which asymptomatic people can transmit the pathogen.Public health;Public health surveillance;Epidemiology;COVID-19 (Disease)

Influenza response planning for the centers of excellence for influenza research and surveillance: Science preparedness for enhancing global health security.

BACKGROUND: The Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance (CEIRS) network, funded by the US National Institutes of Health, has been operational since 2007 and is tasked with conducting research to improve understanding of influenza viruses. Recently, CEIRS developed an Influenza Response Plan (IRP) to improve science preparedness for the network. METHODS: Development of the IRP involved a collaborative process between project staff, CEIRS center directors or their designees, and NIAID CEIRS leadership (referred to as the Pandemic Planning Advisory Committee [PPAC]). Project staff identified and summarized the response capabilities of each center and then worked with the PPAC to identify and rank research priorities for an emergency response using a modified Delphi method. RESULTS: Key elements of the response plan include tables of response capabilities for each CEIRS center, a framework that outlines and ranks research priorities for CEIRS during an emergency situation, and an operational strategy for executing the research priorities. CONCLUSIONS: The CEIRS IRP highlights the importance of enhancing science preparedness in advance of an influenza pandemic or other influenza-related zoonotic incident to ensure that research can be carried out expeditiously and effectively in emergency situations and to improve global health security.